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Tortious Interference With Inheritance
in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

Wrongful interference with inheritance occurs when a person's
expectations of receiving an inheritance from another are frustrated due to fraudulent interference by a third party.' Such interference may be in the nature of procuring or preventing the
execution of a will, inducing or preventing the revocation or alteration of a will, suppressing or destroying a will, or obtaining an inter
vivos conveyance by unlawful means.2 The issue of what remedies
should be available for such interference has been a problem that
has troubled the courts.
Probate and equitable remedies have long been available to one
who has been wrongfully deprived of a legacy.3 A more recent
development in the law has been the judicial acceptance of a tort
action for intentional interference with inheritance.4 This cause of
1. See Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 187
(1944). See also Comment, Tort Liabilityfor Interference with Testamentary Expectancies
in Decedent's Estates, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 78 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 100 A. 441 (1916) (by falsely representing
plaintiff's mental state, defendants procured a will from plaintiff's father which gave
property to the defendants which would otherwise have gone to plaintiff); Cyr v, Cote,
396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979) (testator was induced to transfer property to the defendants
four days before his death); Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907) (defendant induced testator to draw codicil which defendant knew would be invalid); Creek v.
Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929) (defendant destroyed testator's will); Dulin v.
Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916) (defendant removed that part of the will that
was beneficial to the plaintiff); Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 24, 177 N.E. 591 (1931)
(defendants fraudulently suppressed testator's last will and forged and probated a false
will).
3. In Gains v. Gains, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 190 (1920), the court stated: "A devisee,
who by fraud or force, prevents the revocation of a will, may, in a court of equity, be
considered a trustee for those who would be entitled to the estate, in case it were revoked .. " Id. at 191.
See also Pryor v. Coggin, 17 Ga. 444 (1855) (refusal to probate will where revocation
was fraudulently prevented); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (will
declared void as to defendant beneficiary, who killed testator to prevent revocation of the
will); Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 (1871) (probate refused where testator signed a will
which was different from what he intended); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 (1859) (if
intention to revoke a will was defeated by fraud, court of equity will interfere to prevent
the guilty person from taking advantage of the fraud).
4. An early case refused to allow the tort cause of action on the ground that the
plaintiff had no legal right to an inheritance from his father. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill
104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845), discussed infra notes 26-27. A Louisiana court allowed the tort
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action has now been recognized in a number of jurisdictions,5
although many of the courts which allow the action place some
restrictions upon its use.6
action in Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622 (1855). See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. After Kelly, however, the tortious interference action was not recognized again
in an American court until fifty-two years later in Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81
N.E. 248 (1907). See Comment, supra note 1, at 79.
Perhaps because of the relatively recent acceptance of the tort, there are only a few
cases and commentaries that discuss the cause of action. In addition to Evans and Comment, supra note 1, see Comment, Remedy in Tortfor Wrongful Interference with Testamentary Intent, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 253 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Remedy in Tort];
Comment, Tortious Interference with the Expectancy of a Legacy: Harmon v. Harmon, 32
ME. L. REV. 529 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tortious Interference]; 45 MICH. L. REV.
923 (1947); 27 YALE L.J. 263 (1917-1918); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229 (1983); Annot.,
11 A.L.R.2d 808 (1950); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 474 (1935).
5. Courts in Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia have recognized the tortious interference action. See Mitchell v. Langley, 143 Ga.
827, 85 S.E. 1050 (1915) (action for damages was allowed where defendant fraudulently
induced a member of a benefit society to change beneficiaries on a society certificate);
Newsom v. Estate of Haythorn, 125 Ind. App. 276, 122 N.E.2d 149 (1954) (allegations
that deceased persuaded his mother to revoke an earlier will by which plaintiff received a
smaller sum were sufficient to state a cause of action for damages); Frohwein v.
Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978) (cause of action in tort established where the
defendant allegedly conspired to defraud plaintiff by wrongfully causing testator to execute a new will); Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622 (1855) (cause of action was recognized
where plaintiff alleged that the defendants prevented decedent, by threats and violence,
from executing a will); Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E.
390 (1936) (malicious and wrongful interference with the making of a will, as a result of
which the testator's grandson did not receive his share of the estate, held actionable);
Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931) (cause of action in tort was
allowed where defendants deliberately destroyed will and forged another will which was
probated with the aid of perjured testimony); Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va.
1982) (tort action was recognized where defendant wrote testator's will with provisions
that were contrary to the testator's wishes).
6. Courts in Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Michigan have recognized the cause of action yet have limited the use
of the action for tortious interference. See McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F.Supp. 848 (D.
Colo. 1951), af'd, 201 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1953) (tort relief is not available for the destruction or suppression of a will unless it is impossible to probate the will or plaintiffs
have attempted to probate the will and have failed); Benedict v. Smith, 34 Conn. Supp.
63, 376 A.2d 774 (1977) (plaintiffs could not maintain action against the person allegedly
responsible for the loss of a will where they had not alleged that they had unsuccessfully
attempted to have the lost will probated); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981),
ans. conformed to, 675 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1982) (if adequate relief for wrongful interference with a testamentary expectancy is available in the probate proceedings, that remedy
must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued); Robinson v.
First State Bank of Monticello, 97 Il. 2d 174, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983) (tort action is not
recognized where plaintiffs have an opportunity to contest a probated will but choose not
to do so); Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1939) (where a tort action would, if
successful, render nugatory the apparent rights of defendant under the will, plaintiff's
remedy lay in action to contest will); Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d
424 (1946) (tort action for wrongful destruction of a will could not be maintained where
the petition disclosed no effort to probate the will and did not allege that the missing will
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The tort action was first litigated in Illinois in 195 1,' but it was
not expressly accepted by the courts until thirty years later in Nemeth v. Banhalmi.8 No will was admitted to probate in Nemeth,
and the court did not discuss the effect of probate proceedings on
the availability of the tort action. When the Illinois Supreme
Court later decided Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello,9
however, it refused to recognize the action where the plaintiffs had
decided not to contest a will which had been admitted to probate,
but then attempted to sue in tort after the statutorily prescribed
period for the will contest had expired. Robinson highlights the
potential conflict between tort and probate remedies in cases involving wrongful interference with testamentary expectancies, and
implies the direction to be taken in future cases.
This note will first summarize the development of the cause of
action for tortious interference with inheritance and its treatment
in other jurisdictions. Because the tort action has arisen only recently in Illinois, it is necessary to look at cases from other jurisdictions in order to trace its development and the restrictions on its
use. The note will then review the Illinois precedents relating to
both statutory and common law tort relief which led to the Robinson decision. Next, Robinson will be discussed and analyzed in
light of these prior Illinois decisions. The note will conclude with a
discussion of the possible conflict between the probate and tort
remedies and the implications of Robinson for the future.
BACKGROUND

Probate and Equitable Remedies
Injured parties deprived of a legacy by the wrongful acts of
others have most often sought and found relief in probate and equitable remedies.'" The probate court often provides complete relief
to plaintiffs." This relief may take the form of a refusal by the
could not be probated); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979) (court recognized an
action for tortious interference under appropriate circumstances, without a discussion of
such circumstances, in the case of a fraudulently induced inter vivos transfer); Thayer v.
Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382, 86 N.E. 952 (1909) (where the probate act provides a clear,
ample, and expeditious remedy, that remedy is exclusive); Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425,
227 N.W. 817 (1929) (tort action allowed where plaintiff attempted, but was unable to
prove will in probate proceedings).
7. Lowe Found. v. Northern Trust Co., 342 Ill. App. 379, 96 N.E.2d 831 (1951).
8. 99 Ill. App. 3d 493, 425 N.E.2d 1187 (1981).
9. 97 Ill. 2d 174, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983).
10. See Comment, supra note 1, at 85-87. See also Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence,
and Mistake in Wills, 41 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1928).
11.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 85-86.
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court to probate a fraudulently induced will, thereby allowing the
estate to pass to the rightful heirs by intestacy. 12 Even if a will is
admitted to probate, the injured party may obtain relief by contesting the will. 13 Moreover, if a will is fraudulently suppressed or
destroyed, the probate court can provide an adequate remedy by
probating the lost or destroyed will, if there is sufficient evidence as
to its prior existence and content.14
A fundamental proposition of estate law is that only courts with
a special jurisdiction over probate and testamentary matters may
probate wills. 5 In addition, a probate decree, like other judgments
16
and decrees, is not subject to collateral attack in other courts.
Therefore, another court cannot determine 17the validity of a will
when there is an outstanding probate order.
If one has been deprived of an inheritance, and probate remedies
have proved inadequate, equitable remedies may be available.
Such relief is usually granted where there has been fraud on the
12. See, e.g., Brignati v. Medenwald, 315 Mass. 636, 53 N.E.2d 673 (1944). The
defendant in Brignaticared for the testator before his death and fraudulently induced him
to make a will favorable to the defendant and unfavorable to the plaintiff, testator's only
child. The court held that if the probate court refused to admit the will, complete justice
would be done because the property would pass to the plaintiff by intestacy.
13. See, e.g., Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1939) (tort action not allowed where a will contest action was pending, since both actions involved the same
property and the will contest would provide complete relief).
14. See, e.g., Thayer v. Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382, 383, 86 N.E. 952, 953 (1909). The
court refused to allow a tort action where the lost or destroyed will could be proved in the
probate court, stating: "Under these circumstances the [probate] statute has provided a
clear, ample and expeditious remedy. By numerous decisions of this court, when the
Legislature provides such a remedy, it has been held to be exclusive. Other relief will be
refused where plain and adequate statutory redress is available."
15. 79 AM. JUR. 2D § 850 (1978). In most states, statutes confer jurisdiction over
probate matters to separate probate courts or vest special jurisdiction over such matters
in courts also having jurisdiction over other subjects. Id.
16. See Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 516, 100 A. 441, 443 (1917).
Probate decrees, while not subject to collateral attack, are of course subject to direct
attack. Those methods of attack provided by law for the purpose of reviewing the probate decree are direct. All other methods of attacking the decree are collateral. Whether
a given form of attack is direct or collateral is a matter which is determined by local
procedure. Modem statutes usually provide one or more means of direct attack by which
to revoke the order admitting the will to probate or denying its admission to probate.
The most common forms of direct attack are appeal, error, contest, application to revoke
the order of probate, or an application to re-propound the will. 3 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 26.114 (1961). See also Evans, supra note 1, at
202-05; Comment, supra note 1, at 86-89.
17. Hall, 91 Conn. at 516, 100 A. at 443.
A collateral attack may occur, for example, where there is a new proceeding to relitigate the validity of the will after probate, a proceeding to probate another will which is
inconsistent with the one already admitted to probate, a suit for partition, or a suit to
remove a cloud from the title. 3 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 16, at § 26.141.
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court, that is, where one party deceives the court and prevents the
contestant from having a fair hearing. 8 Equitable relief usually
takes the form of a constructive trust in property received from the
estate by the party guilty of the unlawful interference.19
The Development of the Tort Cause of Action
Although probate and equitable remedies provided relief in
many cases of interference with an expectancy, in some cases they
were unsatisfactory. 20 Eventually, the tort action for intentional
18. Fraud on the court is also known as extrinsic fraud. Such fraud is defined in
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):
Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly
employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side;-these, and
similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and
a fair hearing. . . . In all these cases. . . relief has been granted on the ground
that by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the
judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his
case to the court.
Id. at 65.
This type of fraud is distinguished from intrinsic fraud, or fraud in the original transaction. In the case of fraud in obtaining the execution of the will, or undue influence, the
contestant has an opportunity to submit the issue to the probate court. There is no
reason why a party who is defeated in such a judicial determination of the question of
fraud in the execution of a will should have a rehearing of his case in equity. 3 BOWE &
PARKER, supra note 16, at § 26.20.
19. See Lowe, 342 I11.App. at 385, 96 N.E.2d at 834. The rule as to equitable relief
was stated in Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 399, 53 N.E. 767, 771 (1899):
[W]hen an heir or devisee in a will prevents the testator from providing for one
for whom he would have provided but for the interference of the heir or devisee,
such heir or devisee will be deemed a trustee, by operation of law, of the property, real or personal, received by him from the testator's estate, to the amount
or extent that the defrauded party would have received had not the intention of
the deceased been interfered with.
20. See, e.g., Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907) (defendant induced
testator to execute a codicil to her will in the presence of only one witness, knowing that
the codicil was rendered invalid in probate); Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936) (testator was wrongfully prevented from making a
will; therefore, there was nothing for the probate court to act upon); Dulin v. Bailey, 172
N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916) (defendant fraudulently removed provisions of a will beneficial to the plaintiff, and the evidence accessible to the plaintiff would not prove the entire
contents of the will in the probate court); Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E.
591 (1931) (plaintiff did not discover the fraudulent suppression of testator's will until
twenty years after testator's death, long after the statutory period for a will contest had
ended). See also Evans, supra note 1, at 204-05; Comment, supra note 1, at 85-86.
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interference with inheritance developed as an alternative remedy.
Well over a hundred years ago, an American court held that a tort
action would lie for interference with a testamentary expectancy. 2'
Notwithstanding that decision, plaintiffs in United States courts
seldom attempted the tort remedy until the beginning of the twentieth century.22 Gradually, however, as the range of tort liability
for interference with expectancies in other contexts expanded,23
courts began to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference
with testamentary expectancies as well.24
The Early Cases
American courts first dealt with the tort remedy in 1845, in
Hutchins v. Hutchins.2" In Hutchins, the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant for maliciously inducing the testator to revoke a will which would have given the plaintiff certain property
and to draft a new will giving plaintiff nothing. The court refused
to allow the action for damages, reasoning that the plaintiff's interest in the bequest was too uncertain.26 Of importance to the court
21. Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622 (1855) (plaintiff's claim that defendants, by
threats and violence, prevented decedent from naming plaintiff in the will stated cause of
action).
22. Comment, supra note 1, at 79-80.
23. The tort action for intentional interference with inheritance developed out of
cases that recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with commercial expectancies. Tortious interference with a commercial expectancy was first recognized in the
British case of Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). In Lumley, the defendant
convinced a singer to break her exclusive contract with the plaintiff theater owner. The
court held that a tort action would lie against one who wrongfully or maliciously induced
a person under contract with the plaintiff to break the contract.
After Lumley, tort liability expanded with regard to contracts, the right to seek employment, the right to carry on a lawful business, and expectancies under life insurance
policies. See Tortious Interference, supra note 4, at 531. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971); Broida & Handler, Tortious Interfer-

ence with Contract and Prospective Advantage in Illinois, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 325
(1983); Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV.
335 (1980); Green, Relational Interests-Commercial Relations, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1
(1935).
24. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 100 A. 441 (1917); Lewis v. Corbin, 195
Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907); Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929);
Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916).
25. 7 Hill 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
26. Id. at 109-10. In his first will the testator devised a farm to the plaintiff, his son.
He revoked that will after the defendants falsely represented to him that the plaintiff was
embezzling his money and mortgaging his land. The testator then executed a second will
which omitted the devise to the plaintiff. After the second will was admitted to probate,
the plaintiff brought an action for damages. In denying the cause of action, the court
stated:
In respect to the farm devised to him by the first will, [the plaintiff] fails to show
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was the possibility that the plaintiff's expectancy might not have
materialized, since the testator might have changed his mind or
lost the property before his death.2 7
A decade later, in Kelly v. Kelly,28 a Louisiana court allowed a
tort action to be brought. In Kelly, the court held that the action
would lie against one who, by force and violence, prevented a person from executing a will in favor of the plaintiff.2 9 Although a
tort theory was allowed in Kelly, actions for tortious interference
with inheritance virtually disappeared from the dockets of American courts until after the turn of the century.30
Utilization of a tort theory for interference with inheritance witnessed a revival as courts began to protect testamentary expectancies. 3 ' In a number of cases where the tort action was allowed, the
testator had actually taken steps toward perfecting the gift or bequest,32 or the defendant's fraud in preventing the expectancy from
materializing continued until the testator's death. 3 Under those
that he had any such interest in it as the law will recognize. The only foundation of his claim rests upon the mere unexecuted intention of his father to make
a gift of the property; and this cannot be said to have conferred a right of any
kind. To hold otherwise . . . would be next to saying that every voluntary

courtesy was a matter of legal obligation; that private thoughts and intentions,
concerning benevolent or charitable contributions of property, might be seized
upon as the foundation of a right which the law would deal with and protect.
Id. at 109.
27. Id. at 110.
28. 10 La. Ann. 622 (1855). In Kelly, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, the
decedent's mother and brother, prevented her husband from executing a will in her favor.
The court held that the plaintiff alleged a sufficient ground of action but that she failed to
prove her case. The record showed only that the persons called to witness the decedent's
will left the house after perceiving dissatisfaction in the family. The court found that the
witnesses left of their own free will and not because of threats or violence.
29. Id. at 622.
30. See Comment, supra note 1, at 79 n.7.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (testator's
fixed intention to make bequest in favor of plaintiff was noted in a written agreement);
Mitchell v. Langley, 143 Ga. 827, 85 S.E. 1050 (1915) (member of benefit society had
taken out a certificate payable at his death to his three half-sisters).
33. See, e.g., Hegarty v. Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1943) (judge instructed
the jury that it could not find in favor of the plaintiff unless it found that the interference
was continuously operating and effective at the time the gift otherwise would have taken
place); Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907) (court sustained defendant's
demurrer on ground that pleading did not aver facts which excluded the possibility that
the testatrix changed her intention in regard to the legacy and which showed that fraud
continued to operate until her death). Cf. Casternovia v. Casternovia, 82 N.J. Super. 251,
197 A.2d 406 (1964), where the court held that no tort action for interference with an
expected gift or legacy will lie if the donor is alive and competent. The court stated:
It seems to us that the ratio decidendi of the decisional law giving recognition to
causes of action for the protection of an expectant donative interest is 'strong
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circumstances, the plaintiff's interest in the decedent's property
was no longer considered too uncertain to warrant protection, and
the wrongful interference became actionable.34
Current Status of the Tort Remedy
A number of states now recognize a cause of action for intentional interference with inheritance. 35 The courts allowing the action have not discussed the customary tort elements of duty,
breach, causation and injury.3 6 Instead, they have noted one or
more of the following elements which the plaintiff would have to
prove in order to recover: the existence of the expectancy; the reasonable certainty that the plaintiff would have received the expectancy but for defendant's interference; the intention of the
defendant to interfere with the expectancy; tortious conduct, such
as fraud, duress, or undue influence, involved in the interference;
and damages.37
Although courts have recognized the tort action, there is a split
probability' that the anticipated gift or legacy would have been received but for
wrongful interference, which necessarily subsumes the death or mental incompetency of the donor at the time the action is instituted.
82 N.J. Super. at 256, 197 A.2d at 409.
See also Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1979), discussed in Tortious Interference, supra note 4. In Harmon, the court held that prior to his mother's death the plaintiff could maintain an action in tort against the defendants for wrongful interference with
his intended legacy. The plaintiff's mother was eighty-seven years old and in ill health
when the defendants induced her to transfer valuable property to them, thereby effectively disinheriting the plaintiff.
34. See Comment, supra note 1, at 81-82.
35. See supra note 5.
36. See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 30.
37. See, e.g., Davison v. Feuerherd, 391 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff must prove to a reasonable certainty that she would have received the expectancy but
for defendant's malicious interference); Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) (the elements that were established included a fixed intention to make a bequest on the part of the testator, strong probability that the anticipated gift or legacy
would have been received but for wrongful interference, and wrongful interference); Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 99 Ill. App. 3d 493, 425 N.E.2d 1187 (1981) (the court noted that the
following elements were required: existence of expectancy, reasonable certainty that
plaintiff would have received the expectancy but for defendant's interference, intention of
defendant to interfere with the expectancy, tortious conduct, and damages); Hegarty v.
Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1943) (plaintiff must prove an intention to make
bequest and intentional interference by the defendant); Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520,
81 N.E. 248 (1907) (to create a liability there must be not only a wrong inflicted by
defendant, but also damages to the plaintiff resulting directly therefrom, and plaintiff
must show facts excluding the possibility that testator, before his death, changed his purpose respecting the legacy).
After noting that the tortious interference action may be difficult to prove, one court
remarked, "There is an old maxim of the law, 'No wrong without a remedy.' The plaintiff. . . has a right to 'fish' in defendant's pond-whether he catches anything is yet to be

1984]

Interference with Inheritance

of authority as to when such an action will be allowed.3" In the
majority of jurisdictions, the tort action will be allowed only if no
adequate remedy is available in the probate proceedings; if an adequate probate remedy exists, the tort action will be considered a
collateral attack on the probate decree and will not be allowed.39
In contrast, the minority view allows the plaintiff to pursue the tort
remedy even though a will contest determining the issues would be
possible during probate. 4°
Under the majority view, the issue in both the probate and tort
proceedings is normally viewed as a determination of the validity
of the will. 4' By statute, that question is decided by the probate
court, 42 and cannot be subsequently retried in a collateral proceedseen." Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 686, 188 S.E. 390, 394
(1936).
38. See supra note 6 and infra note 40.
39. See supra notes 6, 16.
40. Courts in only three jurisdictions, Iowa, North Carolina, and West Virginia, have
assumed that the tort action is not a collateral attack on the probate decree. In Frohwein
v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978), the plaintiff, who was a beneficiary under
an earlier will, brought an action for damages against the executor and the sole beneficiary under testator's subsequent probated will. The petition alleged that the defendants
had conspired to defraud the plaintiff by tortiously causing the testator to execute the
subsequent will. The court did not view the law action instituted by the plaintiff as a
collateral attack on the probate order even though the allegations of plaintiff's petition in
the law action could have been presented in a will contest. Id. at 795.
In Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916), the defendants allegedly conspired to deprive the plaintiff of a bequest in testator's will by removing provisions from
the will. The court stated that the plaintiff was not seeking to attack the will on record or
to recover anything out of the estate, but was bringing a tort action against the defendants. Id. at 609, 90 S.E. at 689. It should be noted that in Dulin, the court may have
found that the tort action was not a collateral attack on the probate decree because the
plaintiff did not have an adequate probate remedy. If the plaintiff could not prove the
contents of the will provisions which the defendants allegedly destroyed, her only remedy
would have been against the defendants individually for their tort.
The facts in Dulin are similar to those in Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W.817
(1929), where the plaintiff was unable to prove a destroyed will in the probate proceedings. The court in Creek also permitted the plaintiff to bring a tort action against the
defendants.
In Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982), the plaintiff brought a tortious
interference action against the defendant for writing a will contrary to the testator's
wishes. The court held that the tort action was not within the probate jurisdiction, because the plaintiff was not trying to impeach or establish a will, but was complaining
about a tortious injury. Id. at 263, 264.
41. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 100 A. 441 (1917); Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan.
794, 96 P.2d 880 (1940); Brignati v. Medenwald, 315 Mass. 636, 53 N.E.2d 673 (1944).
42. In Illinois, the question is governed by the Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 , 6-4 (1983), which provides: "If the proponent establishes the will by sufficient competent evidence, it shall be admitted to probate, unless there is proof of fraud,
forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct which in the opinion of the court is
deemed sufficient to invalidate or destroy the will."
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ing.43 This rule is consistent with the equitable principle that relief
from the probate decree will be granted only where there has been
a fraud on the court, and not where there has been a fraud in the
execution of the instrument. 44
Thus, when the plaintiffs have had a reasonable opportunity during the probate proceedings to be heard and to present evidence
regarding the wrongful interference, and the issue of the validity of
the will has been fully considered and decided, courts have not allowed an attack on the probate decree in a later tort or equity action. 45 For example, courts have refused to recognize an action in
tort when plaintiffs made no effort to probate a destroyed will, 46 or
did not attempt to probate a prior favorable will where two wills
existed. 47 It has been argued that this type of reasoning is consistent with the purpose of legislatures in passing probate acts, which
was to ensure that all claims relating to the administration of estates be handled in the probate proceedings, thereby providing a
single forum for settling the rights of the parties.48
A later action for tortious interference will be permitted under
the majority view if adequate relief is not available in the probate
court. 49 Accordingly, a plaintiff has been allowed to bring a tort
claim when the defendant's fraud has not been discovered until af43. See Evans, supra note 1, at 188. See supra notes 16-17.
44. See supra note 1. See also Evans, supra note 1, at 200-02.
45. See Evans, supra note 1, at 200-02; Comment, supra note 1, at 87-88.
Although the plaintiffs right to be heard is important in determining whether the tortious interference action will be considered a collateral attack on the probate decree, the
issue is rarely discussed in due process terms. In DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla.
1981), ans. conformed to, 675 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1982), the plaintiffs asserted that refusal
of their tort action was a violation of their due process rights. The court found that there
was no due process problem, because the entire basis for disallowing the tort action was
the existence of adequate relief in probate. The decision also noted that the state's interest in an orderly succession of property can outweigh a party's equal protection or due
process interests. 408 So. 2d at 220-21.
In Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1940), the court stated that denying the
plaintiff a tort remedy where it would have the same effect as a will contest did not deny
plaintiff a legal right but simply determined her remedy. 150 Kan. at 803, 96 P.2d at 887.
46. See, e.g., Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946).
47. See, e.g., McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), afd, 201
F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1953).
48. As one author has observed:
The purpose of [a probate] statute is obviously to induce the speedy and permanent disposition of the property of deceased persons, and to prevent prolonged
litigation over estates and the resultant uncertainty of titles which would ensue.
There is doubtless a great public interest in such quick and definitive settlement
in a single court.
G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 477, at 143 (rev. 2d ed. 1978). See
also Comment, supra note 1, at 87 n.74.
49. See, e.g., Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929) (because the plain-
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ter the time for contesting a will has expired." ° Also, the action has
been permitted where the defendant's fraudulent conduct has
caused the testator to make an inter vivos conveyance of assets that
the plaintiff would otherwise have received from the estate. 5' In
these cases, because there is no adequate probate remedy, the
plaintiff is permitted to seek relief in5 2tort under the theory that no
wrong should be without a remedy.
Courts which follow the minority position do not consider the
5 3
tort action to be a collateral attack on the probate proceedings.
This is based upon the view that the probate and tort causes of
action are not the same.54 Under this view, the tort action involves
the defendant's personal liability based on his fraudulent conduct
and does not involve the estate or an attack on the will. 5 For example, a tort action was permitted against a defendant who removed from the will the testator's signature and a clause giving the
plaintiff a legacy, even though a previous will of the testator had
tiff was unable to establish in the probate proceeding the existence of a destroyed will, the
tort action was allowed).
50. See, e.g., Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931) (plaintiff did not
discover fraud until twenty years after the will had been admitted to probate). Equity
also generally allows relief in this situation. See, e.g., Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
619 (1844) (after suppression of later will and fraudulent probate of previously revoked
will, the defendant could be required to answer questions regarding the alleged spoilation
of the later will). See also Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927) (husband
forged wife's will, had it probated using perjured testimony, and prevented heirs from
receiving notice of and contesting probate).
51. See, e.g., Hegarty v. Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1943) (defendants induced plaintiff's father to give them property before his death).
52. In Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929), the plaintiff was unable
to establish a destroyed will in a probate proceeding. The court allowed a tort action and
stated that "whenever the law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it will also afford a
remedy." Id. at 428, 227 N.W. at 819. See also Mitchell v. Langley, 143 Ga. 827, 85 S.E.
1050 (1915) (tort action allowed where defendants induced decedent to change beneficiaries on a benefit society certificate); Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d
424 (1946) (if destroyed will can be probated, it should be, but if not, a tort action may be
maintained).
53. See supra note 40.
54. Under the minority view, the courts accept the action for damages as an independent action which is not affected by the probate decree. See, e.g., Frohwein v.
Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978); Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689
(1916); Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982).
55. See Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1978) (plaintiff's action
based on tortious interference with a bequest in his favor did not involve the estate);
Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916) (plaintiff was not seeking to attack the
will, probate a subsequent will, or recover from the estate, but was bringing an independent action in tort against the defendants); Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 262 (W. Va.
1982) (plaintiff was not trying to impeach or establish a will, but rather was complaining
about a tortious injury). See also Remedy in Tort, supra note 4, at 255.
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been admitted to probate.5 6 A tort action has also been allowed
where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants unduly influenced
the testator in the making of the will." In accordance with the
minority view, these courts did not require the plaintiffs to exhaust
58
their probate remedies before bringing an action in tort.
Will Contests in Illinois
In Illinois, a number of decisions have dealt with the probate
remedy of will contests and collateral attacks on the probate decree. 59 Generally, Illinois courts have upheld the importance of
6
the exclusivity of a will contest to determine the validity of a will. 0
In addition, Illinois decisions have emphasized the strict time limitations that should be imposed upon the bringing of such
contests.61
In Dibble v. Winter,62 the court stated that where the only possible remedy in a proceeding was to set aside a will and render it null
and void, it was, in effect, a will contest, and must be governed by
the appropriate statutory provisions.63 The rule was restated in In
56. This was the situation in Dulin, 172 N.C. at 610, 90 S.E. at 690, where the court
held that the plaintiff could maintain her tort action without attacking or setting aside the
probated will in a direct proceeding.
57. The court in Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d at 795, held that the trial
court erred when it transferred the plaintiff's tort action to the probate docket on the
ground that the alleged undue influence was available to the plaintiff only in the probate
proceedings.
58. See Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 262 (W. Va. 1982), where the court held
that plaintiff's complaint of tortious interference could not even be heard in the probate
proceedings.
59. See, e.g., Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E.2d 892
(1946); Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910); Purdy v. Hall, 134 Ill. 298, 25
N.E. 645 (1890); In re Estate of Gaglione, 109 Ill. App. 3d 748, 441 N.E.2d 332 (1982).
60. See, e.g., Dickman v. Frieling, 395 Ill. 383, 70 N.E.2d 61 (1946); Blyman v.
Shelby Loan & Trust Co., 382 Ill. 415, 47 N.E.2d 706 (1943); In re Estate of Moerschel,
86 Ill. App. 3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 Ill. 2d 412, 243 N.E.2d 236 (1968); Masin v.
Bassford, 381 Ill. 569, 46 N.E.2d 366 (1943); Havill v. Havill, 332 Ill. 11, 163 N.E. 428
(1928); In re Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill. App. 3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131 (1980); In re
Estate of Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 251 N.E.2d 910 (1969); Pedersen v. Dempsey, 341
Ill. App. 141, 93 N.E.2d 85 (1950).
62. 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910).
63. Id. at 251, 93 N.E. at 148. In Dibble, the plaintiffs brought suit to have a foreign
will set aside as a cloud on a land title. Plaintiffs alleged that the will was obtained
through fraud. The court stated that a will contest could not be injected into partition
proceedings, but must be brought under the statute to contest a will. Cf. Neurauter v.
Reiner, 117 Ill. App. 2d 141, 254 N.E.2d 66 (1969), where an action to impose a constructive trust on alleged family partnership assets was not treated as an action to set
aside a will. Although the defendants claimed the action was premised on recovery from
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re Estate of Moerschel,64 where the court added that such a result
was consistent with Illinois' long standing policy favoring the orderly administration of estates.65
It is also a well-established rule in Illinois that the validity of a
will cannot be collaterally attacked after the statutorily prescribed
time period for a will contest has run.66 Under the Illinois Probate
Act, 67 the effect of the order admitting a will to probate is to trans-

fer the real and personal estate of the testator bequeathed in the
will

68

and to establish the validity of the will against collateral at-

tack. 69 However, the probate order is not final as to a will's execution or validity. During the six-month period following the
admission of the will to probate, any interested person may file a
petition directly challenging the validity of the will.7° This gives a
contestant to the will an opportunity to question the circumstances
relating to the execution of the will, the capacity of the testator,
and other relevant facts before the validity of the will is finally established. 71 If a will is admitted to probate, and despite the opportunity to contest the will in a direct proceeding no will contest is
the estate, the court found that the complaint was based on an oral agreement between
the plaintiffs and the decedent.
64. 86 Ill. App. 3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131 (1980). The plaintiff in Moerschel filed a
petition for a declaratory judgment that the testator's will was void. The petition was
dismissed on the grounds that the action was in the nature of a will contest and was not
brought within six months after the admission of the will to probate as required by statute. See also Blyman v. Shelby Loan & Trust Co., 382 Ill. 415, 47 N.E.2d 706 (1943)
(validity of a will cannot be raised as a basis for or defense to a partition suit); Masin v.
Bassford, 381 Ill. 569, 46 N.E.2d 366 (1943) (validity of will must be contested within
statutory period); In re Estate of Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 251 N.E.2d 910 (1969)
(action to contest will must be exercised according to statutory provisions); In re Estate
of Watts, 67 Ill. App. 3d 463, 384 N.E.2d 589 (1979) (court lacked jurisdiction to determine validity of will where no appeal was taken from the order admitting will to probate
and no will contest was brought within the statutory period).
65. Moerschel, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 407 N.E.2d at 1134.
66. Id. at 485, 407 N.E.2d at 1133.
67. Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ,
1-1 to 30-3 (1983).
68. Id. at 4-13.
69. See, e.g., Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 460, 68 N.E.2d 892,
896 (1946).
70. Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10 , 8-1 (1983). The Act defines
an interested person as "one who has or represents a financial interest, property right or
fiduciary status at the time of reference which may be affected by the action, power or
proceeding involved, including without limitation an heir, legatee, creditor, person entitled to a spouse's or child's award and the representative." Id. at 1-2.11.
71. Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 460, 68 N.E.2d 892, 896
(1946). The court stated that the will contest proceeding determines the validity of the
will only and cannot be used to attack the order admitting the will to probate or the effect
of probate. Id. See also Davis v. Upson, 209 Ill. 206. 70 N.E. 602 (1904) (order admitting will to probate could not be attacked in suit to contest a foreign will).
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brought within the statutory period, the validity of the will is
deemed established for all purposes."
The history of will contest proceedings and the policy considerations supporting the statutory time period during which such actions could be brought were treated at length in Luther v. Luther.73
In Luther, the court found that the provision limiting the time for
the filing of a will contest was not a mere statute of limitations, but
was a jurisdictional limitation.74 Since the right to contest the validity of the will was conferred only by statute, and was not previously available in a court of chancery, the court had jurisdiction
only under the limitations imposed by the statute. 75 The court emphasized the necessity of imposing the time limitation in order to
ensure an orderly settlement of the estate and to protect both creditors and the parties taking under the will.7 6 Further, the court recognized that the original probate decree should be considered
binding after a specified time because a long delay resulting from a
will contest could prejudice the rights of the parties involved.77
After Luther, the Illinois courts continued to emphasize the importance of the exclusivity of the will contest and its underlying
policy by continuing to adhere to the available statutory time period.7 In addition to finding the time limit jurisdictional, the
courts also held that it is not tolled by fraudulent concealment or
by any other occurrence not expressly provided for by statute.79
72. Sternberg, 394 Ill at 460, 68 N.E.2d at 896.
73. 122 Ill. 558, 13 N.E. 166 (1887). In Luther, a will was admitted to probate in
1875, yet the suit contesting its validity was not brought until ten years later. At that
time, the statutory period for the filing of will contests was three years, but the plaintiffs
did not learn of the testator's unsoundness of mind nor of the fraud and undue influence
used in obtaining his will until eight years after his death. Notwithstanding these facts,
the court dismissed the case because the statutory time limitation was not met.
74. Id. at 566, 13 N.E. at 169. The plaintiffs in Luther claimed that the Probate Act
provisions for filing the will contest petition within three years was a statute of limitations
and that the defendants waived the bar of the statute because they did not plead it in their
answer. Their position was based on the theory that the right to contest the validity of
the will was a right which existed at common law before the statute and not a new right
conferred by the Probate Act. They claimed, therefore, that the statute merely limited
the time for asserting that right. The court, however, found that the jurisdiction of the
courts to hear cases to set aside the probate of wills was derived exclusively from the
statute. Id. at 565-66, 13 N.E. at 168-69.
75. Id. at 566, 13 N.E. at 169.
76. Id.
77. Id. A later case added: "So important has this been deemed by courts and legislatures that neither fraud and concealment, nor the admitted incompetency of an attesting witness nor even the insanity of an heir can upset an order of probate after the time
allowed." Pedersen v. Dempsey, 341 Ill. App. 141, 143, 93 N.E.2d 85, 86 (1950).
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. See Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 I11. 2d 412, 419, 243 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1969). The

1984]

Interference with Inheritance

Given Illinois' strong emphasis on the importance of the settlement
of estates through the statutory provisions of the Probate Act, relief in tort for intentional interference with inheritance has seldom
been sought in Illinois. °
DISCUSSION

Tortious Interference with Inheritance in Illinois Prior to
Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello
In Illinois, past decisions appear to follow the courts holding the
majority view regarding the availability of the tort action."' Like
those courts, the Illinois courts normally do not permit such actions because they view both probate and tort proceedings as determining the same issue, which is the validity of the will. 8 2 This view

is evident in the Illinois cases dealing with the probate remedy of
will contests.8 3
The Illinois Appellate Court first dealt with the tortious interference action in 1951 in Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Co.14 In
Lowe, the plaintiff, a nonheir, brought suit against the executor of
decedent's estate for wrongful interference with and prevention of
the execution of a codicil to decedent's will. 85 This provision, if

operative, would have bequeathed $500,000 to the plaintiff.8 6 The
decedent had signed a holographic will naming the plaintiff as beneficiary of the $500,000 bequest, and later a codicil without the
amount filled in was signed by the decedent in the presence of witnesses.87 When the omission was brought to the decedent's attention, the defendant, an attorney who had drawn an earlier will and
codicil for the decedent, stated that the $500,000 bequest would
exhaust his entire estate and that the codicil should not be competitioners in Ruffing sought to invalidate a will on the ground of alleged lack of mental
capacity of the decedent. The suit was filed under old section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 72 (1965) over one year after the order admitting the will
to probate, at a time when the statutory period for bringing will contests was nine

months. The court rejected the petitioners' argument that because the probate court had
been abolished as a separate judicial entity since the Luther decision, the limitation period
of the Probate Act was no longer a jurisdictional limitation but was a statute of limitations which could be tolled by fraud.
80. See infra notes 84, 95 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 60, 62-65.
84. 342 Ill. App. 379, 96 N.E.2d 831 (1951).
85. Lowe, 342 Ill. App. at 381, 96 N.E.2d at 832.
86. Id. at 381-82, 96 N.E.2d at 832.
87. Id. at 382, 96 N.E.2d at 832.
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pleted until he had talked with another adviser. 8s The codicil was
then destroyed and a new codicil was signed which did not include
the bequest to the plaintiff. Less than a week later, the decedent
died.89
After the probate court denied probate of the alleged holographic will, the plaintiff appealed.9" On appeal, the plaintiff
sought to claim $500,000 in damages for the wrongful interference
with decedent's testamentary disposition. 9' The court held that the
complaint did not state a cause of action that would warrant an
award of damages in tort. 92 The court did, however, imply that
such a cause of action would lie in Illinois if actionable fraud were
alleged. 93 However, the court found nothing in the complaint to
overcome the presumption that the defendant had acted honestly;
therefore, the facts in Lowe were not sufficient as a basis for recovery. 94 Despite the Lowe court's implication of the availability of an
alternative remedy for wrongful interference with an expectancy,
the tort action did not reappear in the Illinois courts until 1981, in
Nemeth v. Banhalmi.95
In Nemeth, the plaintiff sought damages from her stepsister and
her stepsister's husband for their wrongful interference with an expectancy from her stepfather. 96 The plaintiff alleged that she was a
legatee under two prior wills executed by her stepfather as a result
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 381, 96 N.E.2d at 832. The plaintiff first appealed to the circuit court, but
procured dismissal of that appeal before hearing. Id. at 383, 96 N.E.2d at 833.
91. Id. at 381, 96 N.E.2d at 832. The plaintiff also requested the court to set aside the
new codicil and its probate and to establish a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff.
Id. at 384, 96 N.E.2d at 833. The Appellate Court found that because the plaintiff procured the dismissal of its appeal to the circuit court, the order of the probate court was
still in full force. Since the codicil which would have given the plaintiff an interest in the
estate and made it an interested party had not been probated, the plaintiff was not entitled
to contest the probate of the later codicil. Id. at 385, 96 N.E. 2d at 834. The court also
declined to declare a constructive trust because such relief had never been granted where
the intended testamentary disposition of property had been prevented by the fraud of a
third person. Id. at 386, 96 N.E.2d at 834.
92. Id. at 389, 96 N.E.2d at 835.
93. Id. at 388, 96 N.E.2d at 835. The complaint contained no allegation that the
defendant knew his statement that the $500,000 bequest would exhaust the estate was
false or that the decedent was deceived by the statement or acted upon it. Id. at 388, 96
N.E.2d at 835.
The essential elements of actionable fraud based on misrepresentation are representation, falsity, scienter, deception and injury. Bouxsein v. First Nat'l Bank of Granville,
292 Ill. 500, 502, 127 N.E. 133, 134 (1920).
94. Lowe, 342 Ill. App. at 387-89, 96 N.E.2d at 835.
95. 99 Ill. App. 3d 493, 425 N.E.2d 1187 (1981).
96. Id. at 494-95, 425 N.E.2d at 1188.
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of an oral agreement between him and plaintiff's mother. 97 Following the death of the plaintiff's mother, plaintiff's stepfather went to
live with the defendants, who allegedly induced him to make a new
will leaving almost all of his property to his daughter, one of the
defendants. 98 After the stepfather's death, however, the defendants
could not locate the originals of any of his wills. Consequently, his
entire estate passed to the defendant stepsister by intestacy. 99 The
plaintiff filed a complaint alleging malicious interference with an
expectancy. The circuit court dismissed the complaint."°°
On appeal, the appellate court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to maintain the tort cause of action.' ° This
decision was based, in part, on a nonheir's right to bring such an
action as implied by the Lowe decision. 0 2 The court also found
support for its recognition of the tortious interference action in the
Restatement of Torts, which imposes liability on one who tortiously interferes with the inheritance or gift of another.'0 3
97. Id.
98. Id. at 495, 425 N.E.2d at 1188.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 494, 425 N.E.2d at 1188.
101. Id. at 497, 425 N.E.2d at 1187. After remand, the defendants appealed the trial
court's judgment for plaintiff of $300,000 in damages. Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 125 Ill. App.
3d 938, 466 N.E.2d 977 (1984). The defendants contended that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust her probate remedies and did not prove the essential elements of her cause of
action. The court found that these issues were waived when defendants failed to raise
them in the trial court. Despite the finding of waiver, the court briefly discussed the
Robinson decision. The court suggested that the exhaustion of probate remedies is necessary only where a will has been admitted to probate. Furthermore, where no will has
been submitted, a plaintiff need not provoke a situation which would make the statutory
remedy available rather than pursue her tort remedy. For the statutory remedy to be
available in Nemeth, the plaintiff would have had to attempt to probate the earlier will,
thus provoking the defendants to present proof that it was revoked by the later will, at
which point the plaintiff would have been able to contest denial of admission of the earlier
will to probate.
The court distinguished actions for malicious interference and actions for destruction
of a will. In the latter cases, the tortious conduct alleged is the destruction, concealment,
or other suppression of a valid will after the decedent's death. Where probate statutes or
case law permit probate of a lost will, that procedure should be followed, unless it appears
that proof of the will in a probate proceeding has been rendered impossible by the defendant's actions. Cases of malicious interference involve establishing the invalidity of a previously probated will. In these cases, the claim of tortious interference could be asserted
during the proceedings to admit the allegedly invalid will to probate or in a will contest.
102. Id. at 499, 425 N.E.2d at 1190.
103. The Restatement of Torts provides that:
One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would
otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1977).
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In addition, the Nemeth court relied upon cases from other jurisdictions which had recognized the tort action for wrongful interference. ° The court noted that those cases used one of two
rationales: one, that no wrong is without a remedy; or two, that no
policy reasons exist that would preclude protection to an expectancy in a noncommercial context. 0 5 The court found this second
0 6
rationale to be a sound basis for recognizing the tort action.1
The decision also discussed the nature of the expectancy to be
protected. Guidance was given to future litigants in that the court
noted that some steps toward perfecting the bequest should be
taken by the testator if the tort action is to be allowed.0 7 While
the court commented that in most of the cases from other jurisdictions the plaintiff was a legatee under a will which was affected in
some way by the defendant's fraudulent conduct, 0 it did not mention the necessity of exhausting available probate remedies before
bringing the tort action.
The Nemeth decision was significant because it clearly estab104. See Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Frohwein v.
Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979);
Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929); Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90
S.E. 689 (1916); Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931).
105. Nemeth, 99 I11.App. 3d at 498, 425 N.E.2d at 1190.
106. Id. at 498, 425 N.E.2d at 1191.
Illinois recognized the cause of action of interference with prospective economic advantage in Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898). The essential elements of the tort are the plaintiffs reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid
business relationship, the defendant's knowledge of the expectancy, intentional interference by the defendant which prevents the expectancy from developing into a valid business relationship, and damages. See Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 709, 713-14, 306 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1973), modified on other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975). For a comprehensive discussion of interference with commercial expectancies in Illinois, see Broida & Handler, supra
note 23.
107. Nemeth, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 425 N.E.2d at 1190-91 (quoting Mitchell v.
Langley, 143 Ga. 827, 835, 85 S.E. 1050, 1053 (1915)):
A bare possibility may not be [protectible]. But where an intending donor, or
testator, or member of a benefit society, has actually taken steps toward perfecting the gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let alone the right of the donee,
devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate and become perfect, we are of
the opinion that there is such a status that an action will lie, if it is maliciously
and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit diverted to the person so acting,
thus occasioning loss to the person who would have received it.
108. Nemeth, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 425 N.E.2d at 1191. The cases which the court
cited wherein the plaintiffs were legatees under a will which had been revoked, destroyed
or modified included: Newsom v. Estate of Haythorn, 125 Ind. App. 276, 122 N.E.2d
149 (1954); Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978); Creek v. Laski, 248
Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929); Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916);
Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931).
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lished the availability of a cause of action for tortious interference
in Illinois. Furthermore, it delineated the elements of proof for
recovery under the tort: (1) the existence of an expectancy; (2) intentional interference with the expectancy by the defendant; (3) the
involvement of tortious conduct, such as fraud, duress, or undue
influence, in the interference; (4) reasonable certainty that the gift
to plaintiff would have been received but for defendant's interference; and (5) damages.10 9 Because no will was ever admitted to
probate in the Nemeth case, however, its broad holding did not
address the possible conflict between the tort remedy it recognized
and the long-standing view of will contest proceedings in Illinois."' Two years later, this conflict was brought sharply into focus in Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello."'
Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello
Robinson was the first Illinois Supreme Court case to discuss the
tort action for intentional interference with inheritance. In Robinson, the decedent had executed a will in 1973 naming five unrelated
individuals as legatees. That will was revoked by a 1974 will and a
1976 codicil which left substantially all of the decedent's estate to
defendant Doss, who was decedent's friend, confidant and legal adviser. 1 2 After the 1974 will and 1976 codicil were admitted to probate, the plaintiffs, who were the decedent's heirs, Doss, and the
legatees under the 1973 will entered into a written settlement
agreement." 3 Two years after signing the agreement, the plaintiffs
filed suit against the defendant bank for breach of fiduciary duty
and for concealment of a document which purported to revoke the
first will of the decedent and against defendant Doss for intentional
interference with inheritance."14 The plaintiffs in Robinson did not
specifically raise any issues with regard to the validity of the decedent's will or codicil, and sought no damages against the estate.' '5
The trial court dismissed all three counts. 1 6 The appellate
court, however, held that the plaintiffs' complaint against Doss did
109. Nemeth, 99 I11.App. 3d at 499, 425 N.E.2d at 1191.
110. See supra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
111. 97 Ill. 2d 174, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983).
112. Id. at 176, 454 N.E.2d at 289.
113. Id. at 176-77, 454 N.E.2d at 290.
114. Id. at 180, 454 N.E.2d at 291.
115. Id. at 181, 454 N.E.2d at 292.
116. Id. at 181-82, 454 N.E.2d at 292. The trial court dismissed all three counts with
prejudice, but without a finding of fact, conclusion of law, or any other reason for
dismissal.
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state a valid cause of action for tortious interference."1 7 On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court again dismissed all three counts. "8s The
court stated that underlying the plaintiffs' whole complaint was the
necessary determination that the decedent's 1974 will and 1976
codicil which were admitted to probate and became valid under the
Probate Act of 1975"1 were invalid. 20 The will and codicil were
found to be valid, because no direct proceeding had been brought
to contest the will within the statutorily prescribed time period. 12 1
Plaintiffs relied upon Lowe and Nemeth in the count for tortious
interference against Doss.1 22 The court, however, distinguished
these cases on a factual basis. The court noted that the plaintiff in
Lowe, unlike the plaintiffs in Robinson, did bring an appeal to con23
test the order admitting the codicil to decedent's will to probate.
Furthermore, in Nemeth, no will was ever admitted to probate, so
there could not be a contest of the admission of the will to probate
under the Probate Act, as there could have been in Robinson.
Therefore, the court refused to accept Nemeth as authority for the
plaintiffs' assertion that Illinois recognizes a cause of action for intentional interference with inheritance. 24 The court held that in a
was available, it would
probated estate where a will contest remedy
25
not recognize a cause of action in tort.
In denying the plaintiffs an opportunity to maintain their tort
action, the Robinson court stressed the importance of limiting the
time in which the validity of a will could be questioned and of
creating stability in the administration of estates. 126 The court
117. Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 104 Ill. App. 3d 758, 766, 433
N.E.2d 285, 291 (1982). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
counts against defendant bank, referring to it as a late will contest. Id. at 763-64, 433
N.E.2d at 289. Although the court referred to the importance of the exclusivity and time
limitations of will contests in its discussion of the counts against the bank, it did not
mention the line of will contest cases in its discussion of the count against Doss.
118. Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 186-87, 454 N.E.2d at 294-95.
1-1 to 30-3 (1983).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ,
2d at 182, 454 N.E.2d at 292.
120. Robinson, 97 I11.
121. Id. at 183, 454 N.E.2d at 293.
122. See supra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
123. Robinson, 97 I1l. 2d at 185, 454 N.E.2d at 294.
124. Id.
125. Id. In its holding, the court noted that the will had been admitted to probate
and that after hiring an attorney, the plaintiffs had decided not to contest the will. Furthermore, the plaintiffs had entered into a settlement agreement for $125,000 and agreed
to release the other parties, including defendant Doss, from any further claims. Finally,
the plaintiffs had allowed the statutorily prescribed period for the filing of the will contest
to expire, and thus the validity of the will was established. Id.
126. Id. The court quoted Pedersen v. Dempsey, 341 Ill. App. 141, 93 N.E.2d 85
(1950), for the rationale for the limit on filing will contests: "the pressing importance of
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stated that the time considerations, along with the goal of assuring
the exclusivity of a will contest, were some of the purposes behind
the Probate Act. Accordingly, to allow the tortious interference
action to be relitigated years after the will had been admitted to
valid under the Probate Act would cirprobate and had become
27
cumvent the statute.

ANALYSIS

Robinson was an outgrowth of the earlier Illinois cases involving
will contests and the applicable statutory time limitations. 2 ' The
decision is important for the limitations it imposes on the availability of the tort action for interference that was recognized by the
Nemeth court. 1 29 Moreover, in light of the precedents and policy
considerations, the Robinson case was correctly decided. The decision is in accordance with the long standing policy in Illinois regarding the importance of the exclusivity of will contests. 3 ° In
addition, Robinson follows the view of the majority of courts from
the use of a tort remedy where proother jurisdictions by denying
3
bate relief is available. '

The majority view requires the exhaustion of probate remedies
before a tort action will be permitted. 32 While this rule maintains
the integrity of the probate system, it also allows the plaintiff the
additional protection of the tort remedy where probate remedies
are not adequate or available.
Robinson highlights the potential conflict between statutory and
tort remedies when plaintiffs are seeking relief for intentional interference with inheritance. When both types of relief are available, it
may be preferable to limit the plaintiff's choice to the probate remedy because this remedy will provide adequate relief in most cases
of intentional interference. Where a will has been fraudulently induced, the court can refuse to admit it to probate.' 33 If a will has
been wrongfully suppressed or destroyed, the court can provide relief by probating the lost or destroyed will.134 Even if a will has
securing an orderly settlement of estates, to prevent embarrassment to creditors and
others, and to avoid as much confusion as possible in the vast amount of property rights
and titles that pass through probate." 341 Ill. App. at 143, 93 N.E.2d at 86.
127. Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 185-86, 454 N.E.2d at 294.
128. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 6, 41-48 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 12.
134. See supra note 14.
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been admitted to probate, a remedy exists in the form of a will
contest. 35
If plaintiffs were permitted to bring an action at law rather than
follow the statutorily mandated estate administration procedures,
the efficacy of the system would be diminished. Probate proceedings should come to a certain and final resolution within a reasonable period of time in order to avoid confusion and protect
creditors and others. 3 6 If a tort action may be brought months or
even years after the validity of the will has been established in the
probate proceedings, the final settlement of all matters relating to
the estate could be delayed and the rights of the parties may be
prejudiced. 137 States have enacted probate statutes to prevent such
an occurrence. 38 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to sidestep
these statutory provisions where the same issue, the validity of the
will, would be decided in both the probate proceedings and the tort
action. The situation in Robinson was clearly one in which the tort
action would have had the same consequences as a will contest.
In Robinson, if the plaintiffs had successfully maintained their
135. See supra note 13.
136. Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558, 566, 13 N.E. 166, 169 (1887). In Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874), the court stated:
The public interest requires that the estates of deceased persons, being deprived
of a master, and subject to all manner of claims, should at once devolve to a new
and competent ownership; and, consequently, that there should be some convenient jurisdiction and mode of proceeding by which this devolution may be effected with least chance of injustice and fraud; and that the result attained
should be firm and perpetual.
88 U.S. at 509.
137. See Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill. 2d 356, 466 N.E.2d 224 (1984). In Ogle, the court
allowed a negligence action to be brought against the attorney who had prepared testator's will. Because the will did not properly reflect the testator's intent, the beneficiaries
did not receive a bequest. The court distinguished the undue influence issue in Robinson
from the negligence question in Ogle, noting that the plaintiffs in Ogle could not have
pursued their claims in a will contest. Therefore, the negligence action was not a collateral attack on the probate decree.
138. See, e.g., Estate of Ariola v. Ariola, 69 Ill. App. 3d 158, 171, 386 N.E.2d 862,
872 (1979) (the purpose of the Probate Act is to permit an administration to get underway as quickly as possible, yet still provide an adequate opportunity to test the validity of
the will); Carney v. Kosko, 229 Md. 112, 117-18, 182 A.2d 28, 30 (1962) (it is the policy
of the Testamentary Act to promote the prompt probate of wills); Hanna v. Sheetz, 205
S.W.2d 955 (Mo. App. 1947) (the code is designed to expedite the final administration of
estates in as short a time and with as little expense as possible); In re Arnold's Will, 125
N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (1953) (the purpose of a probate proceeding is to encompass every
possible claim and interest that might concern the estate so that when the assets of the
estate pass to the new owners, clear title vests in them); Lillard v. Tolliver, 154 Tenn. 304,
315, 285 S.W. 576, 579 (1926) (probate proceedings should not only determine who is
entitled to inherit the property from the deceased, but also hasten the administration of
the estate and the payment of debts).
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action for intentional interference with inheritance, defendant Doss
would have lost the same property he would have been deprived of
if the will and codicil had been declared invalid in a will contest.
The same issue, Doss's undue influence on the testator, was at the
core of both actions.' 39 Since that matter was settled during the
probate proceedings, the plaintiffs' tort action would have been an
impermissible collateral attack on the probate decree."
Allowing the plaintiffs to bring their action for tortious interference after the statutory period for a will contest had expired would
also have been contrary to the policy requiring that the integrity of
the probate process be maintained.' 4' In Robinson, the plaintiffs
clearly had an opportunity to pursue a will contest during the probate proceedings. Not only did they hire an attorney before deciding not to contest the will, but they also entered into a settlement
agreement releasing the other parties from any further claims. 142
They then allowed the statutory period43 for the will contest to expire before instituting the tort action.'
In light of these considerations, where a will contest remedy is
available and adequate, as in Robinson, the court should not allow
the plaintiff to bring a tort action which would have the effect of
setting aside the validity of a will as determined by the probate
proceedings.'44 This rule would also preclude the use of the tort
remedy during the six month period for will contests, if the latter
remedy were available."' One problem, however, is that in certain

situations it is difficult to ascertain whether the probate remedy is
adequate. Moreover, the narrow holding of Robinson 46 left this
question unanswered.
Determining the Adequacy of the Probate Remedy
Although an adequate probate remedy should be available in
dealing with most wills, the probate court cannot deal with what
139. Robinson, 97 II. 2d at 186, 454 N.E.2d at 294. In denying the tort action, the
court remarked: "Given the facts in this case, if we were to allow the plaintiffs to maintain their tort action, we would be giving them a second bite of the apple and defeating
the purpose of the exclusivity of a will contest ... "
140. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
142. Robinson, 97 Il1. 2d 174, 186, 454 N.E.2d 288, 294.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
145. See Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946) (attempt
should be made to probate destroyed will during statutory period before tort relief may be
sought).
146. 97 I1. 2d 174, 186, 454 N.E.2d 288, 294 (1983).
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does not exist. Thus in certain situations, a probate remedy is
clearly not available. For example, where the testator has been
wrongfully prevented from making a will, 4 ' and as a result thereof
no probate proceeding is possible, a tort action should be allowed.
Similarly, the plaintiff should be permitted to seek relief in tort
where the defendant has caused the testator to make a fraudulent
inter vivos conveyance that reduces the amount of the estate to be
inherited by the plaintiff.'48
There are some situations in which the plaintiff may have an
available will contest remedy, but may not have an opportunity to
present his case. For example, the plaintiff may not discover the
tortious conduct of the defendant regarding the will until after the
statutory period for the will contest has expired.' 49 Because there
is no longer an adequate probate remedy available, the plaintiff
should be allowed to bring a tort action. The same result should
follow where the plaintiff does not have proper notice of the probate proceedings and thus does not have an opportunity to contest
the will.15 0 In addition, if there has been fraud on the court during
the proceedings as a result of which the plaintiff has not had a fair
determination, the probate decree should be held void and a tort
action permitted.' 5' In these situations, the issue of the validity of
the will has not been fully and fairly litigated during the probate
proceedings; therefore, a later determination relating to the same
issue should not be considered a collateral attack on the probate
decree.
In certain circumstances, the plaintiff may appear to have an opportunity for a fair hearing on the issue of the validity of a will
during the hearing to admit the will to probate, but in fact may be
unable to prove his case because of the fraudulent actions of the
defendant. At the hearing, the sole question presented is whether
52
the will submitted to probate meets the statutory requirements.
147. The tort action was recognized on these grounds in Bohannon v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 180 S.E. 390 (1936).
148. See, e.g., Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Me. 1979).
149. This was the factual situation in Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 243-44, 177
N.E. 591, 592 (1931), where the court held that plaintiffs petition, alleging that the defendants fraudulently suppressed the testator's last will, stated a cause of action although
he did not discover the fraud until twenty years after the testator's death.
150. See, e.g., Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 203, 182 P. 189, 201
(1919) (probate decree set aside where deserted family had no notice of proceedings given
under decedent's assumed name).
151. See supra note 18.
152. It has long been recognized that the proof necessary to entitle a will to probate is confined to the essential elements fixed by the statute
and is for the
purpose of establishing whether a prima facie case of validity has been made
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Where the defendant wrongfully induces the testator to draw a will
or codicil which the defendant knows is invalid,153 fraudulently
prevents the revocation of a will,'5 4 destroys or suppresses a will,'"5

or fraudulently removes provisions of a will that are beneficial to
the plaintiff,'56 the plaintiff may not be able to present the necessary proof on the issue of the validity of the will. "7 At the hearing,
the plaintiff may present competent evidence on the issue of fraud,
forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct sufficient to invalidate the will.'
There may be difficulty in gathering such evidence, however, because of the lack of discovery at this stage of the
proceedings. 9
Despite the fact that the defendant's wrongful conduct may preclude the plaintiff from prevailing in the initial probate hearing, the
.*...
The hearing is to determine whether the will has been executed with the
formalities required by statute ....
Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 111. 2d 412, 420, 243 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1968).
153. See, e.g., Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 526-27, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (1907).
154. See Evans, supra note 1, at 196.
155. See, e.g., Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 431-32, 227 N.W. 817, 820 (1929).
156. See Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 609, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (1916).
157. The formal statutory requirements for the admission of a will to probate are
met:
(a) When each of 2 attesting witnesses to a will states that (1) he was present
and saw the testator or some person in his presence and by his direction sign the
will in the presence of the witness or the testator acknowledged it to the witness
as his act, (2) the will was attested by the witness in the presence of the testator
and (3) he believed the testator to be of sound mind and memory at the time of
signing or acknowledging the will....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , 6-4 (1983).
Illinois courts also permit the issue of revocation of the proferred will to be litigated at
the hearing. In re Estate of Millsap, 75 Ill. 2d 247, 388 N.E.2d 374 (1979). Under the
Illinois Probate Act:
A will may be revoked only (1) by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating it
by the testator himself or by some person in his presence and by his direction
and consent, (2) by the execution of a later will declaring the revocation, (3) by
a later will to the extent that it is inconsistent with the prior will or (4) by the
execution of an instrument declaring the revocation and signed and attested in
the manner prescribed by this Article for the signing and attestation of a will.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , 4-7 (1983).
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110 , 6-4 (1983).
159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Haines, 51 Ill. App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.2d 548 (1977); In
re Estate of Kvasauskas, 5 Ill. App. 3d 202, 282 N.E.2d 465 (1972). In Kvasauskas, the
appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
discovery sought by the contestant prior to the hearing for admission of the will to probate, because "the procedure provided in the probate act for the prompt and orderly
administration of estates should not be unnecessarily delayed where the rights of all interested parties are already adequately safeguarded." Id. at 204, 282 N.E.2d at 467.
For further discussion of evidentiary problems in probate proceedings, see Brown, Selected Evidence Problems in Illinois Will Contests, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 599 (1981) and
Mason & Weisbard, The Pitfalls of Will Contest Litigation, 16 J. MAR. 499 (1983).
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plaintiff has an additional opportunity to present his case during a
will contest. 160 In that proceeding, the full panoply of discovery
tools is available and should be utilized.' 6 1 Moreover, a presumption of undue influence relating to certain fiduciaries may aid the
plaintiff in the will contest.' 62 On the other hand, the plaintiff's
case may be weakened by his inability to include evidence of decla63
rations by a testator which would impeach or contradict the will. 1
The evidentiary rules mentioned above relating to the presumption
of undue influence and the exclusion of certain declarations by a
testator are unique to will contests; ' therefore, the outcome of the
litigation may depend on whether the plaintiff brings his action in
the form of a will contest or in tort. The question remains open
whether the plaintiff should be allowed to choose the more
favorable forum for his case. Given the Illinois courts' long-standing interest in facilitating the administration of estates through the
exclusive use of will contests, it appears that the plaintiff should be
required to pursue his remedy in the probate proceedings unless he
clearly cannot have a fair determination there. If the defendant's
conduct by itself completely precludes the presentation of the
plaintiff's case, the plaintiff should be allowed to bring a tort action. The defendant should not be allowed to profit from his
wrongdoing in such a situation, regardless of the policy favoring
the use of probate proceedings in cases of wrongful interference
with inheritance.
CONCLUSION

Parties deprived of a legacy by the wrongful conduct of others
have often found relief in probate and equitable remedies. The tort
action for intentional interference with inheritance has developed
as an alternative remedy. Illinois courts recognized the tort in Nemeth, but recently limited its use in Robinson. The majority of
jurisdictions which recognize the tort consider the action an impermissible collateral attack on the probate decree where an adequate
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ,
8-1, 8-2 (1983).
161. Kvasauskas, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 204, 282 N.E.2d at 466.
162. For a presumption of undue influence to exist, the plaintiff must show:
"(1) there [is] a fiduciary or confidential relationship, (2) that the devisee is the dominant
and the testator is the dependent party, and (3) that the will was procured by and in favor
of the fiduciary through the use of his dominant fiduciary or confidential relationship."
Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 309, 134 N.E.2d 249, 258 (1956) (quoting Redmond v.
Steele, 5 Ill. 2d 602, 612, 126 N.E 2d 619, 625 (1955)).
163. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 I11.353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949); Pollock v. Pollock, 328
Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78 N.E. 1 (1906).
164. Mason, supra note 159, at 500.
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remedy is available in the probate proceedings. Robinson is consistent with this view and is also proper in light of Illinois precedent
and policy supporting the exclusivity and time limitations of will
contests.
After Robinson, where an adequate probate remedy is available
and the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to be heard and may
obtain full relief in the probate proceedings, use of the tort remedy
will not be permitted. Every wrong must have a remedy, however,
and if the plaintiff cannot obtain adequate relief in probate, his
right to such relief should outweigh the policies favoring the orderly settlement of estates and he should be permitted to maintain
an action for tortious interference with inheritance.
LINDA S. STINEHART

